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THE LAW STUDENT'S HELPER.

A SURETY'S CLAIM AGAINST HIS BANKRUPT
PRINCIPAL UNDER THE PRESENT LAW
By EVANS HOLBROOK

pal,
surety and
creditor relationship
gives rise ofto princimany
HE peculiar
three-sided
vexatious questions of law, and one of the
most interesting of these vexatious questions is that
of the relationship between surety and principal in
the case of the latter's bankruptcy. Under such circumstances, the creditor's right is fairly simple;
he may prove his debt against the principal, take
such dividend as may be declared, and recover the
balance of the debt from the surety, his remedy
against the latter being expressly saved by Sec. 16 of
the present Bankruptcy Act. But the position of
the surety is less clear. Upon becoming a surety, he
has acquired a two-sided status of liability and right;
he has become liable to pay money to the creditor
if the principal defaults; and if he does so pay to
the creditor, he has a right to be reimbursed by
the principal for the payment so made. In other
words, the surety is contingently the debtor of the
creditor, and the creditor of the debtor (principal).
And this contingent liability and right exist in the
surety from the time of making the contract of
suretyship. He is, clearly enough, always liable to
pay the debt to the creditor if the principal does
not, and he is also always the possessor of a right
against the principal, namely, the right to be reimbursed for any payment he may have to make on
the principal's account. It is the nature of this right
that leads to the difficulty of determining the status
in bankruptcy of the surety's claim against his bankrupt principal. It is clear that the surety, from the
time of making the contract of suretyship, has a potential claim, or contingent possibility of a right,
against his principal, but it is equally clear that this
claim or right does not become absolute and fixed
until the surety has made a payment for his principal. Until this time he has no right of action against
his principal, but merely a contingent possibility of a
right. The following questions naturally arise as to
this right to reimbursement: Can the holder of this
claim (the surety) join in a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against the principal? Can he prove
his claim against the principal's estate? Is his right
against the principal barred by the latter's discharge
in bankruptcy? Is the surety, by virtue of his inchoate claim, a creditor who may be preferred or
defrauded by the bankrupt principal?
Under the Federal Bankruptcy Acts of 1841 and
1867, it is clear that the surety's claim for reimbursement by his bankrupt principal was a provable claim
against the principal, and that it was therefore barred
by the principal's discharge in bankruptcy. And it
is also perfectly clear that such a claim is provable
and is discharged under the English Bankruptcy
Act, whose provisions for the proof of contingent
and uncertain claims go far beyond anything that has
been contained in any of the Federal Bankruptcy
Acts. The Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898, however, differs considerably from the previous statutes,
and much doubt has arisen over the precise effect
of its provisions as to claims of the nature of a
surety's claim for reimbursement. The doubt comes
largely from the uncertainty as to the provisions of
Secs. 57i and 63a (1) and (4) of the Act: the latter
section prescribes what claims are provable, as follows:

"'a. Debts of the bankrupt which may be proved
and allowed against his estate which are (1) a
fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an
instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time
of the filing of the petition against him, whether
then payable or not, with any interest thereon which
would have been recoverable at that date or with a
rebate of interest upon such as were not then payable and did not bear interest; * * * (4) founded
upon an open account, or upon a contract express
or implied;"
while the former section contains the statute's only
direct reference to the proof of claims of indorsers
and other sureties, in the following words:
"Whenever a creditor, whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured by the individual undertaking
of any person, fails to prove such claim, such person
may do so in the creditor's name, and if he discharges such undertaking in whole or in part he shall
be subrogated to that extent to the rights of the
creditor."
The question presents itself: Is the surety's claim
to a reimbursement "a fixed liability * * * absolutely owing at the time of the filing o.f the petition"
or a debt "founded * * * upon a contract express
or implied," so as to be a provable debt under See. 63a
(1) and (4) ; or is the surety's only right under the
Act the right to insure a proper proof of the creditor's debt against the bankrupt principal, and thus
reduce, by the amount of any dividend that may be
paid, the amount that the surety will eventually have
to pay to the creditor? And it is remarkable that
the courts have been able to give so many answers
and reasons for answers to this question.
In the first place, many courts have expressed
grave doubts as to whether any contingent claims
are provable under the Act of 1898. It is clear
that a landlord's claim for rent accruing after his
tenant's bankruptcy is not provable, nor is a landlord's claim which is based upon a tenant's contract
to indemnify the landlord for any loss of rents that
may follow a possible bankruptcy of the tenant.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in I re Roth & Appel, held that the landlord's
claim, considered in either of the above aspects, "was
altogether contingent in its nature" and held that
the claim could not be proved under Sec. 63a (1)
as "a fixed liability as evidenced by
* * an
instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of
filing the petition," or under Sec. 63a (4) as "founded
upon * *..
a contract express or implied," basing
its holding on the authority of it re Swift and In
re Adams and quoting from these cases as follows:
"That part of the present bankruptcy act which
describes what debts may be proved does not repeat
at all points the words 'owing at the time of the filing
of the petition,' but it is impossible to consider it
other than as though it did thus repeat them." "But
a creditor cannot prove for an indebtedness arising
between the filing of the involuntary petition and
adjudication. This appears from the analogy of sections 63a (1), (2), (3), and (5), as applied to the
interpretation of clause (4). In clauses (1) and (4),
for example, the limit of time must be the same,
inasmuch as clause (4) includes clause (1), and, if
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clause (4) were less limited in point of time, the
limit imposed on clause (1) would become nugatory."
And the Supreme Court, in Dunbar vs. Dunbar,
while conceding that the Act of 1898 provides for
discharging some classes of contingent demands or
claims, holds that a husband's undertaking to pay an
annuity to his divorced wife during her life or
widowhood is not a provable debt against his estate
in bankruptcy and is not barred by the discharge.
The court refers to the "extraordinarily broad language" of the English Act, some decisions under
which were cited in argument, and says:
*.. no such broad language is found in our
bankruptcy act of 1898. * -:
We do not think
that by the use of the language in section 6 3a it
was intended to permit proof of contingent debts or
liabilities or demands the valuation or estimation
of which it was substantially impossible to prove."
Under the view expressed in these decisions, it is not
difficult to justify the view of the Massachusetts
court in deciding baldly that no contingent claims
are provable under the present bankruptcy act.
On the other hand, there is abundant authority for
the proposition that certain kinds of contingent
claims are provable; some courts hold that See. 63a
(4) includes contingent contract claims, because they
are "founded upon * * * a contract express
or implied," disregarding the interpretation of that
clause in the Swift and Adams cases (supra) and
taking the view that any claim founded on an express
or implied contract may be proved; other cases
hold merely that the contingent claims of sureties
and indorsers are provable, and that the provability
of these rests upon the provision of Sec. 57i. The
validitv of the former contention is perhaps debatable, but it seems clear that the proof provided for
in Sec. 57i is of the claim of the creditor and not
that of the surety: in other words, under this section the creditor proves his own claim; if the creditor fails to do so, the surety is allowed to prove it
for him, and thus reduce the amount that the surety
will have to pay the creditor ultimately. But the
section nowhere gives the surety a right to prove
a claim based on the obligation of the principal to
reimburse the surety, and in case proof of the
creditor's claim is made by the surety under Sec. 57i
and Rule XXI (4), it is provided by the rule that
"no dividend shall be paid upon such claim, except
upon satisfactory proof that it will diminish pro
taoto the original debt," thus indicating, apparently,
the view of the Supreme Court that the claim proved
under Sec. 57i is only the claim of the creditor.
It is obvious, therefore, that there is considerable
difference of opinion as to the provability, under the
present act, of contingent claims, and it may be of
interest to review the decisions on the question of
the surety's right against his bankrupt principal, as
the question has come before the courts in various
phases.
It is. of course, clear that if the surety, before the
bankruptcy of the principal, has been compelled to
pay the latter's debt, he has at the time of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition a provable claim under
Sec. 63a (1), being "a fixed liability, as evidenced by
* an instrument in writing, absolutely owing
at the time of the filing of the petition," and the
creditor, having been paid in full, has no claim
against the bankrupt. If, however, the payment by
the surety is made after the filing of the petition,
but before the expiration of .the time set for the filing
of claims under Section 57n, a more difficult question
is presented. If a debt is proved, is it the surety's
debt, or is it the creditor's debt, with the surety in
the position of a payer entitled to subrogation under

Sec. 57i? In the case of In re Dillon it was held
that the proof must still be made in the name of the
creditor, and that a claim filed under such circumstances in the name of the surety should be rejected.
In the case of i re Heyman it was also held that
under these circumstances the claim should be filed
in the name of the creditor. But the ruling in these
cases is merely technical, as the surety, having discharged the liability, is thereupon subrogated to the
rights of the creditor under Sec. 57i, and the result
is therefore practically the same as in the case of
payment by the surety before the principal's bankruptcy the creditor has been paid his debt in full,
and the surety has, in effect, received a dividend on
the amount he has been compelled to pay. In such
cases the surety's liability and right have become
absolute during the bankruptcy proceedings, and it
is clear that a correct result has been reached by
following the provisions of the Act. Such cases are
somewhat analogous to those upholding the provability of a claim against a bankrupt surety, maturing between the date of the petition and the expiration of the time for filing claims, but are even more
clearly within the provisions of the statute.
The most difficult situations arise, however, when
the courts have to consider the status of the surety
who has not made any payment on account of his
bankrupt principal's debt, and probably will not make
any such payment during the bankruptcy proceedings,
and possibly may never be called upon to make any
such payment. This question has presented itself to
the courts under varying circumstances and in various classes of cases, and the courts have come to
various conclusions: the fundamental question in all
these cases being "is the surety's claim provable?"
and the answers to this question seeming to depend
less upon the words of the statute than upon the
circumstances under which the case arises. Typical
questions which arise are: (1) may the surety be a
petitioning creditor? (2) may he prove his claim
against the bankrupt? (3) is he capable of being
preferred as a "creditor" under the statute? and (4)
is his claim against his principal barred by the latter's
discharge in bankruptcy?
(1) MAY THE SURETY ac A PETITIONING CREDITOR?
The answer to this question clearly depends upon
whether or not the surety's claim is a provable one
under the provisions of the Act. Under Sec. la (9)
a creditor is "anyone who owns a demand or claim
provable in bankruptcy" and under Sec. 59b "three
or more creditors who have provable claims * * *"
may file a petition to have their debtor adjudged a
bankrupt. Therefore if a claim is provable under
Sec. 63, its holder is entitled to be a petitioning creditor.
This situation seems to have come squarely before the court for decision in only one case, in
which the court, holding that sureties on notes
given by the alleged bankrupt could not join in an
involuntary petition against their principal, said:
"On each of the notes referred to, the debt or
claim is that of the holder of the obligation to whom
it is due, the surety having no direct interest in it,
being only secondarily or contingently liable. He
may pay the debt and become the holder, with all
the rights incident thereto, but unless and until he
does he occupies a secondary and subordinate position. The right to move is, in the first instance,
lodged in the one who is actually possessed of the
obligation of the debtor * * * the surety who has
not taken up the obligation has no provable claim,
and therefore has no standing to petition. It is not
provided in the law that at that stage he can inter-
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vene, either in his own name or in the name of the
creditor, and institute involuntary proceedings."
And it is difficult to see how the court could have
come to a different conclusion without directly allowing a double proof. If a surety's claim is provable
for the purpose of this section (Sec. 59b), a creditor
and a surety or sureties could lump their claims and
thus a note for $100 secured by four indorsers could
be the foundation of a petition against the maker,
if he owed debts amounting to $1000. To carry the
reasoning still further toward absurdity, a note for
$100 secured by ten indorsers would alone render the
maker amenable to involuntary bankruptcy, for any
one of the indorsers may possibly have to pay the
full amount of the note, and as it cannot be determined which one may become thus entitled to reimbursement by the maker, each ought to have a provable claim. It seems clear then that the court was
right in deciding that the surety's claim is not "provable" so as to entitle him to be a petitioning creditor.

(2)

MAY THE SURETY PROVE HIS CLAIM AGAINST THE
BANKRUPT PRINCIPAL?

This question is really at the basis of all the decisions on the status of the surety's claim, and there
is a large number of cases based on the premise that
a surety is a "creditor," and therefore that he owns
a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy. But only
two cases have come to the writer's notice in which
the court expressly passed upon the allowance of the
claim of a surety who had not paid the principal's
debt, and in both of these cases the claim was dismissed. In Insley vs. Garside the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressly held that
such a claim was not provable by the surety, but
allowed the surety to prove the principal debt in the
name of the creditor, under Sec. 57i. And in Dr.
Voorhees Co. Judge Archbald upheld the referee's
dismissal of a surety's claim against the bankrupt
principal on the authority of Phillips vs. Dreher Shoe
Co. decided by the same judge in 1902. It may be
that such claims have been admitted as "provable"
debts in uncontested cases, but it seems unlikely, as
even in the Heyman and Dillon cases, where the
surety had actually paid the debt, it was held that the
proof must nevertheless be made in the name of the
creditor. The authorities, then, are evidently to the
effect that a surety, who has not paid his principal's
debt, does not have a provable claim, unless Sec. 57i
is held to allow the proof of the surety's claim instead
of the creditor's.
(3) MAY THE SURETY BE "PREFERRED" AS HIS PRINCIPAL'S CREDITOR?

A preference is a judgment against, or a transfer
by, an insolvent, the effect of such judgment or
transfer being to enable one creditor to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than any other creditor; we have seen that under Sec. la (9) a creditor
is "anyone who owns a demand or claim provable in
bankruptcy," the provability of claims being determined by Sec. 63. It follows, then, that a person cannot be "preferred" under Sec. 60a, unless he is a
creditor, so if a surety is held to be capable of being
preferred, it must be because his claim against his
principal is a provable one.
The cases of preference which are of interest in
this discussion, though all based upon the view that
the surety is a creditor of his principal, are presented
to the courts under several different sections of the
statute, because of the various effects of a preference
of a creditor. The sections noted below have called
for interpretation as to whether or not a surety is
included in them.
Sec. 3a (2) providing that an insolvent's transfer

of property to one or more creditors with intent to
prefer such creditors over his other creditors, is an
act of bankruptcy. In United States Surety Co. vs.
Iowa Manufacturing Co. it was held that a payment
by an insolvent principal to a surety on its bond was
a payment to a "creditor" so as to subject the principal to involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.
Sec. 57g, providing that the claims of creditors who
have received certain kinds of preferences shall not
be allowed unless such creditors surrender their preferences. The first manner in which a surety became
subject to this section of the statute was by paying
the debt after the creditor had received a preference,
and then attempting to prove the claim in the name
of the creditor under Sec. 57i. It was held early in
the history of the bankruptcy act that under such
circumstances the surety who had paid the debt was
only "subrogated to the right of the creditor" and
that he therefore took the creditor's claim cum onere,
and could not prove it without surrendering the preference received by the creditor. The question also
arose in cases where the bankrupt had given a note
or check to the surety, who transferred it to a banker
by whom payment was received from the bankrupt.
It was held that the surety (the payee and indorser)
was preferred by the payment to the banker, because
his liability on the note or check was reduced, and
therefore he could not prove any other claim he
might have against the bankrupt unless he surrendered this preference paid to the banker.
Sec. 6ob, providing that the trustee in bankruptcy
may set aside and recover preferential judgments
and transfers in cases where the person receiving (or
benefited by) the preference had reasonable ground
to believe that a preference was being effected. It
has been held, with no dissent, that under this section a trustee in bankruptcy can recover a transfer
made to a surety under the circumstances recited in
the section, thus holding that a surety is a creditor
with a provable claim.
Most of these preference cases proceed upon the
reasoning in Swarts vs. Siegel, the leading case on the
subject, which is cited as authority in practically all
of the subsequent cases. In this case sureties had
signed notes for the bankrupt, who had made payments on them while insolvent (these payments being
preferences) and the sureties had paid the balance
of the notes after the bankruptcy. The court held
that the sureties could not prove their claim without
returning the preferences paid to the holder of the
notes. Judge Sanborn, who wrote the opinion in
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
reasoned as follows: a creditor is one who gives
credit in business transactions, according to the Century Dictionary, and the sureties here, by lending
their signatures to the maker of the notes, gave
credit to it : the debt of a principal to his indorser or
surety, before the latter has paid the obligation, is a
contingent obligation founded on contract; and
therefore provable under See. 63a (4) : moreover,
Sec. 57i allows a surety to prove the creditor's claim
against the bankrupt principal's estate. To sum up,
"the accepted and customary definition of the term
'creditor,' its definition in the Act of 1898, the clear
terms and patent meaning of that act upon the subject under discussion, the better reasons and the
greater weight of authority, all converge to establish
and sustain the conclusion that an indorser, an accommodation maker, or a surety for a bankrupt is
his creditor." It must be conceded that the great
weight of authority agrees with this decision of Judge
Sanborn, and it is clear, of course, that the result
attained is desirable. A bankrupt ought not to be
allowed to pay a note so as to take care of a surety
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any more than he ought to be allowed to pay a note
to take care of the payee. But it seems at least
doubtful if a surety is a "creditor" under the terms
of the act, and clearly nobody but a "creditor" can
be preferred under Sec. 60a. The decisions in the
preference cases cited above in which the sureties
had paid the debt and were compelled, under Sec.
57i, to become subrogated cunt onere, are firmly
enough based upon the clear meaning of the statute,
but the other cases, which base the infirmity of the
surety's claim upon the fact that he is a "creditor"
who has been preferred, seem to be objectionable in
reasoning, though not in result, and- are clearly inconsistent with many decisions under this act.
(4) IS THE SURETY'S CLAIM BARRED BY THE PRINCIPAL'S DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY?

Under Sec. 17 a discharge in bankruptcy releases
the bankrupt from all of his provable debts, with
some exceptions not here important. If, therefore,
a surety's claim against his principal is a provable
debt of the latter, the principal is discharged from
his liability, even though the surety does not have
to make the payment on his principal's account until
after the latter has been discharged in bankruptcy.
To put concretely a typical case: S is surety on B's
note to X, payable in two years; immediately after
the making of the note, B becomes bankrupt, X
proves his claim, or S proves it for him, and X receives, as do the other creditors, a dividend of 25
per cent., on the payment of which B is discharged
from all of his provable debts. After the discharge,
S is compelled to pay X the remaining 75 per cent.
of the amount of the note, and sues B to recover the
amount so paid. Was B's implied contract to reimburse S a provable claim at the time of the filing of
B's petition; or did this contract become effective
only upon the payment by the surety of his principal's
debt? If the former is the case, B's discharge is a
bar to S's action; if the latter, it is not. And the
cases under the present statute are apparently about
evenly divided on this point. In Massachusetts two
cases have held that the surety's claim was contingent at the date of the bankrupt's petition, and therefore was not provable and is not barred. And the
Supreme Court of New York (Appellate Term) has
come to the same conclusion as to the claim of a
retired partner who had been compelled, after the
continuing partner's bankruptcy, to pay a firm debt
which the latter had agreed to pay. In the suit by the
retired partner the other pleaded his discharge in
bankruptcy; the court held that at the time of bankruptcy the retired partner had no claim or existing
debt against the other, that no claim arose until the
other's failure to pay the firm debt (which he had
agreed to pay) made it necessary for the retired
partner to pay it, and that the discharge in bankruptcy
was therefore ineffective as a bar.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of New
York (Appellate Division) held in an early case
under the present statute that the discharge in bankruptcy of a maker of a note was a bar to his indorser's action for reimbursement when the indorser
had paid, after the maker's bankruptcy, a judgment
on the note obtained against both maker and indorser
before the maker's bankruptcy. The court cited
Mace vs. Wells, arising under the Act of 1841, and
Hunt vs. Taylor, arising under the Act of 1867, and
said, with reference to Sec. 57i, that it was intended
to accomplish the same effect as Sec. 19 of the Act
of 1867. The same result has been attained in two
other cases. In Hayer vs. Comstock, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a note-maker's discharge in
bankruptcy was a bar to a surety's action based on
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his payment of the note several months after the
maker's bankruptcy. The court held that the debt
was a "fixed liability absolutely owing" at the date of
the petition, regardless of the person to whom it was
owing, thus confusing the liability of the debtor to
his creditor with his liability to his surety (though
the court says that it does not overlook the distinction
between the two liabilities) ; and observed further
that the plaintiff could have proved under Sec. 57i,
thus again confusing the two different liabilities. The
reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court in the case
of Sweaney vs. Baugher is even more unsatisfactory.
There B conveyed land to X subject to a mortgage,
but B agreed to pay off the mortgage before a date
certain. Before this date arrived he became bankrupt, and scheduled as one of his liabilities his obligation to pay off the mortgage on X's land. (This
is the only instance in all of these cases where it
appears that any obligation to the surety was scheduled as a liability by the bankrupt.) After B's discharge, X paid the mortgage (though he had assumed no personal liability to pay it) and sued B for
reimbursement under the contract between them. B
pleaded his discharge, and the court held that, as the
debt was a fixed liability due to the mortgagee at the
date of B's petition, and as X, being a surety, could
have proved under Sec. 57i, the debt was a provable
claim and thus discharged.
It may be that the result attained by the rule laid
down in the three cases last cited is desirable; it is
doubtless the aim of a modern bankruptcy law to relieve the debtor of all of his obligations (with, of
course, some obvious exceptions), and any rule that
accomplishes this result is commendable on the
ground of expediency. But it is submitted that the
reasoning of these courts is hardly proof against
criticism, and it would be indefinitely better if the
statute were so amended as to bring about this desirable result without too great a strain on the language of the act. And it must be remembered that
the Supreme Court has not always been willing to
permit even an admittedly desirable result to be
brought about by a distortion of the provisions of
the bankruptcy act.
To sum up, the position of a surety who has not
paid anything on account of his principal's debt is
apparently as follows: be cannot petition to have his
principal adjudicated bankrupt, because his claim is
not provable; he cannot prove his claim in his principal's bankruptcy, for the same reason; yet he is
(and has been since the inception of his contract of
suretyship) a creditor having a provable claim, capable of being preferred by his principal, and subject
to all the various effects of receiving a preference;
and when, after his principal's bankruptcy, he has
paid the latter's debt, he may or may not be able to
recover from his principal, according to the jurisdiction in which suit must be brought.-(U. of P. Law
Review.)
THE SPICE OF LIFE.
EVEN THAT.-Representative Nye, of Minnesota,
has much of the wit of his lamented brother, Bill
Nye. Himself a lawyer, Representative Nye said at
a lawyers' banquet in Minneapolis:
"Lawyers have grand reputations for energy and
perseverance. A lad said to his father one day:
"'Father, do lawyers tell the truth?"
"'Yes, my boy,' the father answered. 'Lawyers
will do anything to win a case'."-Washington Star.

